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SUMMARY
In this thesis, we explore the use of policy approximation for reducing the computa-
tional cost of learning Nash equilibria in Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL).
Existing multi-agent reinforcement learning methods are either computationally demand-
ing or do not necessarily converge to a Nash Equilibrium (NE) without additional strin-
gent assumptions. We propose a new algorithm for zero-sum stochastic games in which
each agent simultaneously learns a Nash policy and an entropy-regularized policy. The
two policies help each other towards convergence: the former guides the latter to the de-
sired Nash equilibrium, while the latter serves as an efficient approximation of the former.
We demonstrate the possibility of transferring previous training experience to a different
environment, which enables the agents to adapt quickly. We also provide a dynamic hyper-
parameter scheduling scheme for further expedited convergence. Empirical results applied
to a number of stochastic games show that the proposed algorithm converges to the Nash





Both biological and artificial agents (e.g. robots controlled through Artificial Intelligence)
tend to follow goal-directed behaviors in order to survive and achieve desired outcomes [1].
Learning to choose actions that maximize rewards is the foundation behind Reinforcement
Learning (RL) [2, 3]. While the success of RL has been demonstrated in many single agent
domains [4, 5], more work is needed to extend the same results to multi-agent scenarios.
The difficultly of extending single-agent RL methods to multi-agent scenarios stems from
the fact that the interactions between the agents make learning difficult, since changes in
the policy of one agent will affect that of the other agents, and vice versa [6].
One widely adopted framework to address multi-agent systems is via Stochastic Games
(SG), where one treats the interactions between all agents as a dynamic game. The resulting
MARL framework assumes a group of autonomous agents that share a common environ-
ment in which the agents choose actions independently and interact with each other [7] to
reach an equilibrium. When all agents are rational, and under the assumption of perfect
information, the most natural solution concept is the one of a NE [3, 8, 9].
The blanket assumptions of perfect rationality [10] and perfect information behind NE
are too strict for many scenarios, especially those involving humans [11]. In addition,
computing NE involving more than a handful of alternative strategies is challenging. There
is a need for algorithms that generate rational, yet computationally efficient policies that
can be used in a wide variety of multi-agent situations. Several approaches have been
proposed to find alternative ways to compute policies in multi-agent scenarios. One popular
approach is to simplify the learning problem [12, 13, 14] via providing agents with extra
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information during the training phase and thus allow the agents to compute “fast” but less
rational policies. Such algorithms are unlikely to converge to a rational (Nash) equilibrium.
Other algorithms learn directly a NE using computationally demanding operators [15, 16,
17, 18], such as Minimax-Q [15] and Nash-Q [16], which solve multiple highly-coupled
optimization problems at each learning step. Under certain conditions, agents using these
algorithms are more logical/rational (in the sense that they try to compute NE policies) but
in doing so, these agents tend to take more time to compute the corresponding policies.
Intelligent agents also tend to efficiently utilize prior knowledge to learn new tasks and
develop important competencies [19]. Entropy-regularized Q-learning [20] (also referred
to as soft Q-learning), originally introduced to address the maximization-bias 1 , has the po-
tential of transferring previous experiences to new environments by incorporating a prior (a
reference policy or a previously learnt policy) thus restricting exploration only to policies
close to the prior. The soft Q-learning idea was recently extended to two-agent zero-sum
and team games [21]. This two-agent Soft-Q algorithm avoids the use of the expensive
Nash operator to update the game value at each learning step; the two agents, instead, use
the closed-form expressions of the soft-optimal policies. Since none of the agents com-
putes NE policies, the resulting policies in the two-agent Soft-Q may be far from optimal,
however.
In this paper, we propose a new entropy-regularized Q-learning algorithm for two-agent
zero-sum games, called Soft Nash Q2-learning (SNQ2), which combines the two-agent
Soft-Q and the Minimax-Q algorithms for more efficient learning. The proposed algorithm
learns two different Q-values: the original Q-value and the soft Q-value. The two val-
ues are used asynchronously in a certain “feedback” learning mechanism in which soft-Q
policies act as an approximation of the Nash policies to update the game Q-value, while
1Over-estimation (“maximization bias”) of Q-learning refers to the case where the algorithm always favors
actions that have positive errors, especially when multiple actions have similar Q-values owing to the use of
the max operator. These errors can be introduced from stochastic dynamics or from function approximation.
With the entropy-regularization, the resulted policy no longer concentrates on the current maximizing action
but instead spreads over multiple actions, which facilitate the exploration.
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periodically the Nash policies are used to update the priors in the soft-Q policies of the two
agents. Consequently, SNQ2 significantly reduces the frequency of using the expensive
Minimax operator, and thus expedites convergence to the Nash equilibrium. Furthermore,
the priors used in the soft-Q policy updates provide the opportunity to transfer knowledge
from previous training experience or from human experts to a new environment, and thus
“warm-start” the learning process. This is demonstrated in the numerical examples section.
Since the balance between the two Q-learning systems plays a critical role in the per-
formance of the SNQ2 algorithm, we also introduce a dynamic scheduling scheme that
actively changes the frequency of the updates of the priors with the new Nash policies. We
empirically show the convergence of SNQ2 to a Nash equilibrium for several stochastic
games demonstrating major speed-up over existing algorithms.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 1.2 presents and summarizes
some of the related work; Chapter 2 discusses some background of RL, soft Q-learning
and two-agent zero-sum stochastic games; Chapter 3 presents the proposed SNQ2 algo-
rithm; Chapter 4 demonstrates the convergence and performance of the SNQ2 algorithm
by applying it to a number of stochastic games and compares its performance to multiple
existing algorithms; Chapter 5 concludes this paper and summarizes the contribution of
this work.
1.2 Related Work
Games, first explored in the economics community [22, 23], offer a natural framework
to generalize single-agent Markov Decision Process (MDP) [3] to a multi-agent settings.
The simplest approach to extend learning in multi-agent settings is to use independently
learning agents. This was the approach with the use of Q-learning in [24], but this approach
fails in many cases due to the non-stationarity of the environment [6]. Some previous
works addressed nonstationarity by introducing an extra mechanism, including centralized
critic [13, 25], conjectures on other agents’ policies [12], variable learning rates [26], and
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neural fictitious play [27, 28].
Many of these works ensure convergence to a NE only in simple versions of stochastic
games, such as repeated games [29]. Other algorithms are designed specifically for coop-
erative settings, such as, optimistic and hysteretic Q-updates [30, 31, 32], policy parameter
sharing [33] and applications to Markov team games [18]. Deep learning techniques, such
as deep Q-learning, have also been investigated for multi-agent scenarios; see, for exam-
ple [34]. While these approaches may be computationally tractable, they are either not
applicable in competitive settings or lack guarantees of convergence to a Nash equilibrium,
a critical concept in competitive games [8]. Approaches that focus on solving for NE poli-
cies on the other hand [15, 16, 17], although principled are, in general, computationally
demanding due to the complexity computing a Nash equilibrium [35]. Different methods
have been investigated to alleviate this problem. The algorithms in [36, 37] apply a mean-
field approximation to model the interactions within a population of agents to that of a
single agent and the average effect from the rest of the agent population. The algorithm
in [38] uses approximate dynamic programming to reduce complexity. MiniMax Multi-
agent Deep Deterministic Policy Gradient (M3DDPG) [39] uses a minimax formulation to
extend the popular Multi-agent Deep Deterministic Policy Gradient (MADDPG) [13] al-
gorithm to competitive settings. These algorithms still rely on performing rather expensive





2.1 Reinforcement Learning for MDPs
In reinforcement learning an agent interacts with an unknown stochastic environment in
order to determine an optimal policy that maximizes the total expected return. When the
agent has perfect information about the effect of its interaction with the environment, these
problems are best formulated in terms of MDP [3, 40]. Formally, a MDP is defined by the
tuple 〈S,A, T ,R, γ〉, where S is the finite state space, A is the finite action space, and
T : S ×S ×A → [0, 1] denotes the state transition probability. Namely, T (s′|s, a) denotes
the probability of being at state s′ at the next time step given that the agent is located at s
and chooses action a at the current time step, such that
∑
s′∈S T (s′|s, a) = 1 is enforced
for all s ∈ S and a ∈ A. For notational convenience, we will often use the notation Tss′(a)
in lieu of T (s′|s, a). The reward function is defined as R : S × A → R. Specifically,
R(s, a) represents the reward the agent collects should she choose action a at state s. The
discount factor γ depicts the trade-off between current and future rewards. An admissible
(mixed) Markov policy is defined as π : A × S → [0, 1], such that
∑
a∈A π(a|s) = 1 for
all s. Since we are dealing with finite action spaces, an admissible policy π can be cast into
vector form at each state s ∈ S as follows:
π(s) =
[
π(a1|s), π(a2|s), . . . , π
(
a|A|
∣∣s)]T ∈ ∆|A|. (2.1)
where ai ∈ Apl for all i = 1, . . . , |Apl|. Here,we use ∆|A| to denote the |A|-dimensional
standard simplex. Once cast into vector form, the policies π(s) can be interpreted as prob-
ability distributions over action space at state s.
The goal of the agent is to find a policy that maximizes the total discounted reward, i.e.,
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to find π∗ = argmaxπ V π(s), where







∣∣∣ s0 = s] , (2.2)
and the expectation is taken over the state-action trajectory starting from s under the policy




2.2 Single Agent Soft Q-Learning
Soft-Q algorithm has been introduced in order to reduce the overestimation problem of
standard Q-learning [20] and also for constructing flexible energy-based stochastic poli-
cies in continuous domains [41]. Soft-Q approaches modify the original unconstrained




















where C restricts the amount the policy π is allowed to deviate from the reference policy ρ
measured in terms of the information 1. Notice that the expectation of the information cost
over the policy π turns out to be the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence between π and ρ.
The expectation is taken over all state-action trajectories starting from s and following the
policy π. See also notation in Equation (2.2).
To solve the constrained optimization problem in Equation (2.3), one introduces a La-
















1The KL-divergence between two distributions is the expectation of the information cost (logarithmic
difference) between the two distributions.
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where the soft-optimal Q-value is defined as












However, for the case where the transition T is not available, one cannot compute
the policies via exact methods like policy iteration or value iteration. One solution is to
apply stochastic approximation [3]. For the Soft-Q algorithm, the soft-optimal Q∗(s, a)
in Equation (2.6) can be learnt using stochastic approximation via the following recursive
learning rule [20]:











In Subsection 3.1.1, we discuss the extension of single-agent Soft-Q algorithm to the
two-agent case. To facilitate understanding of two-agent learning algorithms, we briefly
discuss two-agent stochastic games in the upcoming section.
2.3 Two-Agent Stochastic Games
In two-agent stochastic games, two agents, henceforth referred to as the Player and the
Opponent, interact in the same stochastic environment. In this paper, we are interested,
in particular, in zero-sum games where one of the agent’s gain is the other agent’s loss.
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Formally, a zero-sum stochastic game is defined by the tuple 〈S,Apl,Aop, T ,R, γ〉, where
S is the finite state space, and Apl and Aop are the finite action spaces of the two agents.
The superscripts pl and op denote the Player and the Opponent respectively. Similar to
an MDP, the state transition is defined via T : S × S × Apl × Aop → [0, 1]. Namely,
T (s′|s, apl, aop) denotes the probability that the agents’ joint state is at state s′ at the next
time step, given that the agents are currently at the joint s, and the Player chooses action
apl while the Opponent chooses action aop. Finally,R : S ×Apl×Aop → R represents the
reward structure. Specifically, the quantity R(s, apl, aop) captures the immediate reward
the Player collects should she choose action apl and the Opponent chooses action aop at
state s. For zero-sum games, the Player seeks to maximize the cumulative reward, whereas
the Opponent seeks to minimize it. The Player executes a (mixed) Markov policy πpl :
S × Apl → [0, 1], where π(apl|s) is the probability that the Player will choose action a
when sheis at state s. The policy π(apl|s) is admissible, if
∑
apl∈Apl π(a
pl|s) = 1 for all
states s. We use Πpl to denote all the admissible policies of the Player. The policy πop and
admissible policy set Πop of the Opponent are defined in a similar manner.










where the expectation is over state and joint-action trajectories starting from s and follow-
ing the admissible policy pair (πpl, πop) ∈ Πpl × Πop.
The classical solution to a zero-sum stochastic game is the Nash Equilibrium [23].













Notice that the Nash Equilibrium is also a saddle point [8] of the value function for zero-
sum games. Namely, if the Nash Equilibrium is achieved by the policy pair (πpl*, πop*),
then we have
Vπpl,πop*(s) ≤ Vπpl*,πop*(s) ≤ Vπpl*,πop(s),
for all admissible policy pairs (πpl, πop) ∈ Πpl × Πop and all states s ∈ S . The Minimax
theorem [42] states that for zero-sum stochastic games, there exists a unique value. Namely,
in this case we can define
V∗(s) = Vpl∗(s) = Vop∗(s). (2.10)
Given the optimal value V∗, and similarly to the single agent case, we can define the optimal
Q-value for the game at state s as
Q∗(s, apl, aop) = R(s, apl, aop) + γ
∑
s∈S
Tss′(apl, aop) V∗(s′). (2.11)





said to form a Nash equilibrium if it achieves that optimal value V∗. Note that even though
the optimal value V∗ is unique, there may exist multiple Nash equilibria that achieve the
same optimal value [9]. In the zero-sum case, if (π̃pl, π̃op) and (π̃pl, π̃op) are both Nash
equilibria, then (π̃pl, π̃op) and (π̃pl, π̃op) are also Nash equilibria. As a result, learning al-
gorithms need not distinguish which Nash equilibrium they converge to in the zero-sum
case.
The “unique value” property of zero-sum games enables the development of learning
algorithms that solves Nash equilibrium of such games in resemblance to Q-learning [43].
The Minimax-Q algorithm [15] learns the optimal Q-value for a zero-sum game by apply-
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ing the following recursive learning rule:
Qt+1(st, aplt , a
op




t ) + αt
[
















Qt+1(st, aplt , a
op




t ) + αt
[















It has been shown in [15] that under some mild conditions, the estimateQt from Equa-
tion (2.12) or Equation (2.13) converges to the optimal Q-value in Equation (2.11). The
Nash policies can then be determined from the optimal Q-value using linear programming
[8]. Specifically, the Q-table at each state corresponds to a matrix game. Per Shapley’s The-
orem [8], the Nash policy pair at each state is the solution to the matrix game defined by




3.1 Two-Agent Soft Nash Q2-Learning
In this section, we present the two-agent Soft Nash Q2-Learning algorithm (SNQ2). As the
name suggests, the algorithm relies on two different Q-values: one is the standard Q-value
as in Equation (2.11) and the other one, which we denote as QKL, is the soft Q-value for
the two-agent games, that is an extension of the single-agent soft Q-value in Equation (2.6).
Similarly to the single-agent Soft-Q algorithm, the function QKL allows us to generate a
closed-form soft-optimal policy pair that can be used as an approximation to the actual
Nash policy pair. We then use the approximated policy pair to update the standard Q-value.
In the following, we first introduce the learning rule for the standard Q-value (denoted
Q) and then discuss the learning rule for the soft Q-value (denoted QKL). To find the opti-
mal Q-valueQ∗(s, apl, aop) at each state we apply the following update rule recursively [15,
16]
Qt+1(st, aplt , a
op




t ) + αt
(
R(st, aplt , a
op
t ) + γVt(st+1)
)
, (3.1)
where t is the learning step and αt is the learning rate. After applying the action pair
(aplt , a
op
t ), the agents transit to state st+1, while Vt(st+1) is the estimated optimal value at
state st+1 based on the Q-values at learning step t.
When executing the update in Equation (3.1), we employ two different methods to
compute the estimated value Vt. The first method (used less frequently) resembles the
Minimax-Q [15] and computes the Nash value based on the current Q-value estimations as
in Equation (3.2).
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The second method, soft value update, which is used most frequently, utilizes the in-
formation from the QKL and the soft-optimal policies detailed in Subsection 3.1.1, Equa-
tion (3.11).
3.1.1 Learning rule for QKL and Soft-Optimal policies
Previous work by Grau-Moya et al [21] has extended Soft-Q algorithm to the two-agent
setting. Similarly to the single-agent version of the Soft-Q algorithm, this formulation
augments two information costs to the reward structure to penalize each agent’s deviation
from a given prior. Given the policies πpl and πop for the Player and the Opponent, the
soft-value function is defined as
Vπ
pl,πop
























where the expectation is taken over joint-action and state trajectories, and where ρpl and
ρop are the prior policies for the Player and the Opponent, respectively. It is assumed that
each agent knows each other’s prior. Since we focus on the zero-sum case, we assume that
the Player is the maximizer so that βpl > 0, while the Opponent is the minimizer so that
βop < 0.
Later in this section, we demonstrate how we can utilize the two parameters βpl and βop
to control exploration during the learning process. At the same time, we will actively update
the priors ρpl and ρop, and we treat them as some approximation of Nash policies. This gives
us the advantage to “warm-start” the algorithm by initializing the priors according to some
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previous experience or expert’s knowledge.
The Player and the Opponent compute their optimal soft-values at state s from








KL (s) = V
pl,∗
KL (s). (3.4)
We then define a state-action function as




where the policy pair (πpl∗KL, π
pl∗
KL) achieves the optimal soft value given in Equation (3.8)
below.
For action selection, neither the Player nor the Opponent directly useQ∗KL as it depends
on the action chosen by the other agent, which is not known a priori. Instead, as shown

























respectively. With these definitions, we obtain the soft-optimal policies for both the Player




















where Zpl(s) and Zop(s) are normalizing factors. The policies in Equation (3.7) take the
form of a Boltzmann distribution, where βpl and βop play the role of inverse temperatures.
As βpl and βop go to zero, the soft-optimal policies get closer to the corresponding priors.
On the other hand, as the magnitude of βpl and βop tend to infinity, the soft-optimal policies
become deterministic and the Player (Opponent) chooses the action that maximizes (mini-
mizes) the marginalized Q-value. Essentially, the values of βpl and βop reflect whether the
algorithm trusts the priors more or the Q-values instead. If the algorithm trusts the priors,
the magnitude of βpl and βop should be small, so that the soft-optimal policies generated are
close to the reference. If the algorithm, instead, trusts the Q-values, then the magnitude of
βpl and βop should be large, and the agents optimize based on their respective marginalized
Q-values.
Based on the soft-optimal policies in Equation (3.7), the soft-optimal value V∗KL can be

























We learn Q∗KL(s, apl, aop) by applying the recursive rule
QKL,t+1(st, aplt , a
op




t ) + ηt
(
R(st, aplt , a
op




where ηt is the learning rate, t is the learning step, and VKL,t(st+1) is computed from equa-
tion Equation (3.8) using QplKL,t or Q
op
KL,t from Equation (3.6).
UsingQKL in Equation (3.8) and its corresponding soft-optimal policies in Equation (3.7)
we can update the estimated value Vt in Equation (3.1) as follows. We first cast the learnt
soft-optimal policies πplKL,t and π
op
KL,t in Equation (3.7) at each learning step t into vector
14







2 |s), . . . , πKL,t
(
apl|Apl|







2 |s), . . . , πKL,t
(
aop|Aop|
∣∣s)]T ∈ ∆|Aop|. (3.10b)
The value at each state can then be interpreted as the expected reward under the joint







To obtain the value of the game at a state s, one needs to further generate the matrix
game at that state, which is defined through the reward matrix Qt(s) ∈ R|A
pl|×|Aop|. This




j ). Specifically, the ij-entry of the matrix
Qt(s) corresponds to the estimated Q-value at state s if the Player chooses action apli and
the Opponent chooses action aopj .







current estimate reward matrix Qt(s) to produce the current estimate of the value Vt(s)
in Equation (3.1) as follows.
Second method: Soft-Optimal Value
Vt(s) = πplKL,t(s)
T Qt(s) πopKL,t(s), s ∈ S. (3.11)
When executing the SNQ2 algorithm at a learning step we use either of the two meth-
ods Equation (3.2) or Equation (3.11) to estimate the value. The SNQ2 algorithm follows
a schedule that determines when each of the methods is selected, as shown in Algorithm 1.
3.1.2 Nash Prior Updates
Aside from updating the value function using the Nash policies and soft-optimal policies
to as in Equation (3.2) and Equation (3.11), the proposed SNQ2 algorithm also updates
the priors required by the QKL computation periodically. Given the current Q-value esti-
mation, one can find the Nash policies at each state by solving the following two Linear
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Programming problems [8]. For the player, one can solve:
max v,
subject to v1T − πpl(s)TQt(s) ≤ 0,
1Tπpl(s) = 1,
πpl(s) ≥ 0, (3.12)
and for the opponent:
min u,
subject to u1−Qt(s)πop(s) ≥ 0,
1Tπop(s) = 1,
πop(s) ≥ 0, (3.13)
where 1 is the vector of proper dimension filled with ones. Once the two linear pro-
grams in Equation (3.12) and Equation (3.13) are solved at each state s ∈ S , we have an
updated estimate for the Nash value and the Nash policies of the stochastic game at state
s based on the current estimate Qt. The two optimal objective values in Equation (3.12)
and Equation (3.13) are equal, and they correspond to the unique Nash value at the state s.
We denote the solutions to Equation (3.12) and Equation (3.13) as πplNash,t(s) and π
op
Nash,t(s),
respectively, which are used to update the priors.
The frequency of performing Nash prior updates is determined by some schedule. The
schedule can significantly affect the performance of the algorithm. We provide a dynamic
schedule in Section 3.2 that determines that frequency based on the history of priors poli-
cies. The provided dynamic schedule also decides the decay rate for the inverse tempera-
tures βpl and βop, which control the level of exploration.
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3.1.3 Soft Q2-Learning Algorithm
We summarize the Soft Nash Q2-Learning in Algorithm 1. From line 1 to line 6, we
initialize the algorithm. If there is no specific prior knowledge available the priors can be
set to uniform policies in accordance to the principle of maximum entropy [44, 45]. We
use the index i to denote the episodes and we use t for the learning steps. The values of
βpl and βop are initialized to some large values, as the agents have little trust in their initial
priors and they need to explore the Q-value and the soft Q-value.
Line 8 to line 27 present the update rules for Q and QKL. As discussed in Section 3.1,
we have two methods to choose from to estimate the value at a state: based on soft-optimal
policies or based on the Nash policies. We use the Nash policies to compute the value Vt
only when the learning step is a multiple of the Nash update frequency T . At all the other
learning steps we use the soft-optimal policies to estimate the value Vt.
At episodeM , which is determined dynamically by algorithm 2, the algorithm performs
a prior update as in lines line 20 to line 26. The Nash policies are computed for all states
using the current Q estimate, and the priors are replaced by the computed Nash policies.
The two inverse temperatures βpl and βop are decreased according to a linear schedule, as
the algorithm develops more trust in the priors. The algorithm repeats the whole process
till convergence.
Figure 3.1 illustrates the proposed algorithm visually: the orange box represents the
soft-optimal policy method to update Q. This method is employed when the learning step
is not a multiple of the Nash update frequency T . At this specific learning step, QKL,t
generates the soft policy pair. Combined with the estimated Qt at learning step 1, the soft
policy pair πKL,t is used to update Qt+1. The same soft policy pair is also used to update
QKL,t+1. In this case, the update of Q depends on QKL.
The green box depicts the second method that uses the Nash policies to update Q. At
learning step T (or multiples of T ) the Nash policies are computed based on the current
estimate QT and are used to update the next estimate QT+1. In this case, the updates of Q
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Algorithm 1: Soft Nash Q2-Learning Algorithm
1 Given Apl, Aop, S and learning rates α and η;
2 Given prior update frequency M and Nash update frequency T ;
3 Given the priors ρpl and ρop;
4 Set Q(s, apl, aop) = QKL(s, apl, aop) = 0 for all states s and actions apl, aop;
5 Set βpl and βop to some large values;
6 Set counters i = 0 and t = 0;
7 while Q not converged do
8 while episode i not end do












10 if t mod T == 0 then

















Q(st, aplt , a
op






R(st, aplt , a
op
t ) + γV(st+1)
)
;








17 Update QKL(st, aplt , a
op
t )←
(1− η)QKL(st, aplt , a
op
t ) + η
(
R(st, aplt , a
op
t ) + γVKL(st+1)
)
;
18 t += 1;
19 end
20 if i == M then
21 Compute ρplnew(s) and ρ
op
new(s) using Nash solver on Equation (3.12)
and Equation (3.13) based on current Q for all states s;









23 M += ∆M ;
24 Update ρpl ← ρplnew, ρop ← ρopnew, βpl ← βplnew, βop ← βopnew;
25 Decrease learning rates α and η ;
26 end
27 i += 1;
28 end
29 return Q(s, apl, aop).
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Figure 3.1: The schematic of the SNQ2 algorithm.
and QKL are decoupled.
As depicted in this schematic, QKL feeds information to Q within each episode while
Q feeds information to QKL during the prior policy updates.
3.2 Scheduling of the Hyper-parameters
In this subsection, we provide a dynamic scheduling algorithm for the hyper-parametersM
and β of the SNQ2 algorithm.
As presented in Algorithm 1, the trade-off between computation efficiency and approxi-
mation accuracy is embedded in the prior update frequency. Intuitively, when the new Nash
priors are close to the old ones, the algorithm is close to convergence. In this situation, the
prior update frequency should be decreased (increase ∆M ) and the algorithm should trust
and exploit the priors (decrease βop and βpl).
The default number of episodes between two Nash prior policy updates ∆M0 and the










where α0 is the initial learning rate and Tmax is the maximum length of a learning episode;
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β0 and βend are the initial and final inverse temperatures for both βop and βpl, and Nupdates
is the estimated number of prior updates. This value of M0 allows the algorithm to prop-
erly explore the state and action spaces so that the first prior update is performed with an
informed Q-function. In our numerical experiments we found that β0 = 20, βend = 0.1 and
Nupdates = 10 are good set of values to use.
The dynamic scheduling scheme is summarized in Algorithm 2, where the parameter
σ ∈ (0, 1) is a decrease factor and RelativeDifference captures the performance difference
between old and new priors.
Algorithm 2: Dynamic Schedule for M and β
1 Inputs: old and new priors ρ, ρnew; old prior update length ∆M ; old inverse temperatures β;
current Q;
2 Compute Vold(s) = [ρpl(s)]TQ(s)ρpl(s) and Vnew(s) = [ρplnew(s)]TQ(s)ρplnew(s), for all s;
3 Compute RelativeDifference(s) = |Vnew(s)− Vold(s)|
/
|Vnew(s)|, for all s;
4 Count the number of states where RelativeDifference(s) < δ;
5 if n/|S| ≥ Threshold then
6 ∆M = min{ 1σ ∆M,∆Mmax}, βnew = max{λ βold, βmin};
7 else
8 ∆M = max{σ ∆M,∆Mmin}, βnew = max{βold, βmin};
9 end
10 return ∆M , βnew.
3.3 Warm-starting the Soft Q2-Learning Algorithm
As shown in Algorithm 1, one can warm-start the proposed SNQ2 algorithm by first initial-
izing the priors ρpl and ρop based on some previously learnt policies or on expert demonstra-
tions, and then also postponing the first prior update to exploit these priors. This gives the
SNQ2 algorithm two major advantages over value-based algorithms such as Minimax-Q
and Nash-Q.
First, it is more realistic and easy for human experts to directly provide expert knowl-
edge by demonstrating policies instead of providing the optimal values for each agent. One
can easily demonstrate a policy to an autonomous agent, but one can only qualitatively in-
form the autonomous agent how valuable a specific state is. With data from human demon-
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strations, SNQ2 can easily process these data and convert them to reference policies for
warm-starting. Value-based algorithms, on the other hand, need to first convert the demon-
strations to value-related information, either via Monte-Carlo simulations or via the use of
neural networks [46], both of which, in general, require some noticeable computation time.
As a result, SNQ2 can incorporate human expert knowledge in a much streamlined and
direct manner.
Second, when transferring previous training experience to a new environment, policy
provides a longer and more consistent guidance than value, especially in the case where
the reward structure is also changed. Value-based algorithms, such as Minimax-Q, are
extremely susceptible to reward structure changes when warm-started with learnt values
restored from previous learning experience. The reward change could instantaneously be
reflected in the values, once the agents start to explore the new environment and use the
newly received rewards to update the value function. As the value function quickly gets
“corrupted”, the quality of the policies computed based on the value function deteriorates
also quickly. The learnt value from previous sessions thus can only provide guidance for
a limited number of episodes. On the other hand, SNQ2, if warm-started with previous
training experience, can simply delay the initial prior update, which is controlled by the
parameter M0. With a large M0, SNQ2 is able to efficiently and fully explore the state-
action values under the consistent guidance of the previous experience, even with a change
in the reward structure. With a more informed understanding of the new environment
and the new reward structure, the subsequent updates could be performed in a much more
efficient manner by SNQ2.
Next, we use numerical experiments to demonstrate the performance improvement re-




NUMERICAL EXPERIMENTS AND DISCUSSION
To evaluate the performance of the proposed algorithm, we tested and compared SNQ2 with
several existing algorithms (Minimax-Q [15], WoLF-PHC [26], Single-Q [24]) for three
zero-sum game environments: a two-agent Pursuit-Evasion Game (PEG) [45], in which
the Pursuer aims to capture the Evader; a Sequential Rock-Paper-Scissor Game (sRPS),
in which the two agents play Rock-Paper-Scissor repeatedly till one gets four consecutive
wins; and a Soccer game as in [15].
4.1 Evaluation Criteria
Two metrics were used to evaluate the performance of the algorithms: the number of states
achieving a Nash Equilibrium and the running time. For each game, we computed four
different value functions and compare them to determine whether a state has achieved a
NE:
(1) the Nash value VNash solved exactly via Shapley’s method [8], this is used as ground
truth value;
(2) the learnt value VLearn;
(3) the one-sided MDP value VplLearn computed by fixing the Opponent to her learnt policy;
(4) the one-sided MDP value VopLearn fixing the Player to her learnt policy.
We consider the learnt policies achieve a NE at state s, if∣∣∣VNash(s)− VLearn(s)∣∣∣∣∣VNash(s)∣∣ < ε ∧
∣∣∣VNash(s)− VplLearn(s)∣∣∣∣∣VNash(s)∣∣ < ε ∧
∣∣∣VNash(s)− VopLearn(s)∣∣∣∣∣VNash(s)∣∣ < ε.
(4.1)
Here, we pick a tolerance of ε = 0.03. Notice that the evaluation criterion in Equation (4.1)
is stricter than simply collecting empirical win rates of different agents competing in the
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environment as in [15, 47], since any deviation from the NE could be exploited by either
agent.
4.2 Game Design
Pursuit-Evasion Game. The PEG is played on 4×4, 6×6 and 8×8 grids, as depicted in
Figure Figure 4.1. Both agents seek to avoid collision with the obstacles (marked in black).
The Pursuer strives to capture the Evader by being in the same cell as the Evader. The goal
of the Evader is to reach one of the evasion cells (marked in red) without being captured.
Two agents simultaneously choose one of four actions on each turn: North, South, East,
and West. Each executed action results in a stochastic transition of the agent’s position. In
the default setting, an agent has a 60% chance of successfully moving to its intended cell
and a 40% chance of landing in the cell to the left of the intended direction. The 4×4 and
8×8 PEGs use the default transitions and the 6×6 PEG uses deterministic transitions. In
such setting, a deterministic policy cannot be a Nash policy.
Figure 4.1: The grids of the three pursuit-evasion games.
Soccer. The soccer game [15] is played on a 4×5 grid as depicted in Figure 4.2. Two
agents, A and B, can choose one of five actions on each turn: North, South, East, West, and
Stand, and the two actions are executed in random order which makes the game stochastic.
The circle represents the “ball”. When the agent with the ball steps in to the goal (left for
A and right for B), that player scores and the game restarts. When an agent executes an
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action that would take it to the cell occupied by the other agent, possession of the ball goes
to the stationary agent. Littman [15] argued that the Nash policies of both agents must be
stochastic.
Figure 4.2: The grid of the soccer game.
Sequential Rock-Paper-Scissor. In a sequential Rock-Paper-Scissor game (sRPS), two
agents (denoted player and opponent) play Rock-Paper-Scissor repeatedly. One episode
ends when one of the two agents wins four consecutive games. The states and transitions
are shown in Figure 4.3. State s0 corresponds to the initial state where no one has won
a single RPS game, and states s4 and s8 are the winning (terminal) states of player and
opponent respectively. The Nash policies of sPRS at each state are uniform for both agents.
Figure 4.3: The state transition diagram of sRPS.
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4.3 Implementation Detail
To ensure fair comparaison, all the experiments are conducted single-threadedly on a PC
with AMD Ryzen 1920x CPU and 32G 2666MHz RAM. The plots are averaged over 10
runs.
The game environments and algorithms are coded in Python. Numpy is used for vector
operations and Scipy [48]’s linear programming package linprog is used to solve exact
Nash values and Nash policies of the matrix games at each state.
We implemented and evaluated SNQ2 on the game environments presented in Sec-
tion 4.2 using the evaluation criteria in Section 4.1. The SNQ2 algorithm was initialized
with two types of priors, a uniform prior 1 (SNQ2-U) and a previous experience (SNQ2-
PE). Previous experience for PEGs is learnt in a training session of the same game but with
a different dynamics. For sRPS, the previous experience is a perturbed uniform strategy.
The algorithm also has the option of a fixed schedule (SNQ2-FS) and a dynamic schedule
(SNQ2-DS). Unless otherwise specified, SNQ2 uses a dynamic schedule.
We also implemented in Python three popular alternative algorithms, namely, Minimax-
Q, Single-Q, and WoLF. We fine-tuned these algorithms to get the best performance so as
to demonstrate their actual capabilities.
4.4 Comparison to Existing Methods
We summarize the performance in terms of convergence of these algorithms on the five
game environments in Figure 4.4 and Figure 4.5. In most of the experiments, SNQ2
achieves a slightly better convergence to NE than Minimax-Q, while exhibiting an sig-
nificant reduction in computation time. Single-Q and WoLF are fast but fail to converge to
NE in all five games hence are not shown in Figure 4.5.
The sRPS game of which the ground truth NE is an uniform policy shows that SNQ2
1For sRPS, the default prior is randomly generated, as uniform policies are the Nash policy for this game.
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Figure 4.4: Comparison of convergence rate of all algorithms, We cut off the computation
at 600,000 episodes for 8×8 PEG, due to the large state space.
Figure 4.5: Comparison of computation time for all algorithms. The computation time
on the right is normalized by that of Minimax-Q. We cut off the computation at 600,000
episodes for 8×8 PEG, due to the large state space.
is capable of converging to a fully mixed strategy. In this game, Single-Q learning tries to
learn a pure policy but does not converge; WoLF converges to NE at state s3 and s8 but
with large value deviation, which propagates to other states and results in poor policies.
We then examine the 4×4 PEG game. Despite the relatively small state space, the
stochastic transition at all non-terminal states requires extensive exploration of the envi-
ronment. We plot the convergence trends over 300,000 episodes in Figure 4.6 and over
12,000 seconds for Minimax-Q and SNQ2 in Figure 4.7.
The time to convergence in Figure 4.7 demonstrates the expedited convergence of
SNQ2 in terms of computation time. The episode-wise trend is depicted in Figure 4.6,
where it is shown that SNQ2 maintains the same level of convergence performance as
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Figure 4.6: Episode-wise convergence trends of different algorithms in 4×4 PEG.
Figure 4.7: Time-wise convergence trends of different algorithms in 4×4 PEG.
Minimax-Q, albeit with significantly reduced computation time. This shows that our entropy-
regulated policy approximation approach is both accurate and computationally efficient.
The performance oscillation of SNQ2 at the beginning is the result of the first few prior
updates. As the Q-values are inaccurate at the beginning, the priors generated by these Q-
values are also not accurate, which has long-lasting effects on the subsequent value updates
as seen in Figure 4.6. Thus, updating the priors based solely on the current Q-values may
be detrimental to performance. We have conducted experiments of using Polyak-averaging
on the Q-values and the results showed that averaging does indeed alleviate the initial os-
cillations.
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Figure 4.8: Episode-wise convergence trends of different algorithms in 6×6 PEG (left) and
Soccer (right).
In 6x6 deterministic PEG and Soccer game, similar conclusions can be drawn. Though
as depicted in Figure 4.8, episode-wisely SNQ2 has similar performance as Minimax-
Q, it completely outperforms the later one in terms of computation time till convergence as
illustrated in Figure 4.5, due to the large speed boost of close form solution for soft-optimal
policy over exact Nash policy through linear programming.
4.5 Effect of Warm-Starting
In PEGs, the agents learn their previous experience in the same grid but with a 75% success
rate. To demonstrate the ability of using corrupted prior information, the prior policy fed
to the agent for a new training session is the average of the previously learnt policy and a
uniform policy.
Figure 4.9: Cutoff time performance of the 4×4(left) and 8×8(right) PEGs
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One can observe in Figure 4.5 that previous experience does not shorten the time till
convergence, however, Figure 4.9 demonstrates that it significantly reduces the time to
reach a reasonable performance. In the 4×4 example the time to reach over 90% Nash
convergence is halved from 1,200 seconds with uniform prior down to 600 seconds with
previous experience. In the 8×8 example the time to reach 80% convergence was halved
from 7,200 seconds to 3,600 seconds.
One also observes from Figure 4.6 that the policies generated by SNQ2 with previous
experience converge, episode-wise, slightly faster than Minimax-Q. This “warm-start” fea-
ture has appealing real-world learning applications, where the number of episodes is the
main constraint instead of computation time. In this case, one can first train prior policies
using a simulator and give these as priors to the agents. With SNQ2 one can train the
agents to a reasonable performance with fewer episodes, while maintaining relatively low
computation overhead.
4.6 Effect of Dynamic Scheduling
The effectiveness of dynamic scheduling is demonstrated in Figure 4.6 for the case of the
4×4 PEG where it is shown that dynamic scheduling improved the number of episodes
till convergence. The results for the other examples as shown in Figure 4.8 were similar.
Dynamic scheduling reduces the length that SNQ2 exploits a potentially bad prior when
the Q-values are far from convergence, especially at the beginning. As the initial learning
rate is large, a Q-value based on a bad prior policy could be difficult to correct later on.
The proposed dynamic scheduling also reduces the prior policy update frequency when




CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We have proposed a new algorithm for solving zero-sum games where the agents use
entropy-regularized policies to approximate the Nash policies and thus reduce computa-
tion time till convergence.
Empirically, the proposed algorithm converges to a Nash equilibrium as demonstrated
using several stochastic games of different sizes and levels of stochasticity. Our numerical
experiments showed that the algorithm significantly reduces computation time while main-
taining good performance, when compared with other algorithms, such as Minimax-Q,
WoLF-PHC, and independent Q-learning.
The performance of the algorithm can be improved by applying a dynamic schedul-
ing scheme of the prior update frequency and the annealing of inverse temperature. We
also demonstrated the effectiveness of warm-starting in a new environment using previous
experience.
For future work, we wish to combine SNQ2 with deep learning in order to tackle more
complicated games and extend this idea to continuous state and action spaces. We would





DERIVATION OF SINGLE-AGENT SOFT-Q LEARNING




















where R(s, a) is the reward collected at state s should the agent chooses action a at that
state. The agent follows a policy π and uses policy ρ as its reference policy. For simplicity,
we assume that ρ has positive support for all actions at all states. Otherwise, one can make
the action space A to be state-dependent. When an action does not have positive support
from ρ at a state, one can exclude it from the action space at that specific state. Then, the
information cost in Equation (A.2) is well-defined.








ρ(a1|s), ρ(a2|s), . . . , ρ(a|A||s)
]T ∈ ∆|A|(s),










ρ(s1),ρ(s2), . . . ,ρ(s|S|)
]
∈ ∆|A|,
where si ∈ S for all i = 1, . . . , |S| and where ∆|A| = Π|S|i=1∆|A|(si). We denote the set of
all admissible policies as Π.
The expectation operator in Equation (A.1) and Equation (A.2) is over all state-action tra-
jectories ensuing by executing the policy π starting at s0 = s. Notice that the expectation of
the information cost over the policy π turns out to be the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence













To solve the optimization problem Equation (A.1)-Equation (A.2) we introduce a La-




















As a result of this Lagrangian relaxation, a positive β corresponds to a maximization prob-
lem as presented in Equation (A.1). If the optimization problem in Equation (A.1) is instead
a minimization problem, the multiplier β should take a negative value. Also, if β → ∞,
the information cost constraint Equation (A.2) is no longer in effect, as it can be seen from
the complementary slackness condition.
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We view π(s) as a generalized action taken at state s induced by policy π. Next, with a
slight abuse of notation, we define the Q-value corresponding to the policy π at state s as


































































Given a value vector U ∈ R|S|, we may define an operator B : R|S| → R|S| in resemblance



















Lemma A.1. The Bellman operator B in Equation (A.8) defines a contraction mapping for
γ < 1.





















We will show that Bπ is a contraction mapping under the supremum norm for each admis-
sible policy π ∈ Π. Hence, the value Vπ(s) of policy π can be evaluated for each state





(s), k = 1, 2, . . . .
Consider two value vectors U and V , and define the supremum norm between the two as
‖U − V‖∞ = maxs∈S |U(s)− V(s)|.
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Then, for each state s ∈ S, we have


























































π(a|s) ‖U − V‖∞
= γ‖U − V‖∞.
By applying the max operator on the left hand side, it follows that
‖BπU − BπV‖∞ = maxs∈S
∣∣∣(BπU)(s)− (BπV)(s)∣∣∣ ≤ γU − V∞. (A.10)
Thus, Bπ is a contraction mapping for all admissible policies π ∈ Π for γ < 1.









(s), ∀s ∈ S.
Now consider two value vectors U1 and U2. Let π1 and π2 correspond to the maximizing













Then, we have an alternative representation of the operator B.
BU1 = Bπ1U1, BU2 = Bπ2U2,























(s), ∀π ∈ Π,


























Applying the inequality a ≤ b ≤ c⇒ |b| ≤ max {|a|, |c|}, to (Equation (A.11)) yields
∣∣∣ (BU1)(s)−(BU2)(s)∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣ (Bπ1U1)(s)−(Bπ2U2)(s)∣∣∣ ≤ max
i=1,2
{ ∣∣∣ (BπiU1)(s)− (BπiU2)(s)∣∣∣} .
(A.12)
The lemma now follows from



















{∥∥BπiU1 − BπiU2∥∥∞} ≤ γU1 − U2∞,
where last inequality follows from Equation (A.10). It follows that B is a contraction for
γ < 1.
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As a result of the Banach fixed point theorem [3], from Equation (A.8) there exists a unique

















By defining the soft-optimal Q-value in terms of the generalized action π(s) as




































The following lemma can be found, for example, in [20].
Lemma A.2. For each state s ∈ S, the soft-optimal policy that solves problem (Equa-






Proof. For each s ∈ S , the design variable to be optimized is the |A|-dimensional vector
π(s)(a) = π(a|s) (see Equation (3.10)). It follows that there are |S|×|A| design variables.
From the total probability property
∑
a∈A π(a|s) = 1 for all s ∈ S. We consider the
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π(a|s) = 1, (A.17)






















where λs ∈ R is the Lagrangian multiplier.
The soft-optimal policy can be easily obtained by taking the partial derivative of the La-
grangian in Equation (A.18) with respect to each component π(a|s), and then set the partial
derivatives equal to zero.


















































Solving for π(â|s), we have a single maximum candidate:
π(â|s) = ρ(â|s)e1+βλs+βQ∗KL(s,â). (A.20)





















To verify that the solution in Equation (A.15) is indeed a maximizer, we check the second-
order partial derivative Equation (A.18)
∂2
∂2π(â|s)




We have the second order partial derivative strictly less than zero since β > 0 and π(â|s) >
0, and thus is the objective function concave.








which yields the desired result.
The soft-optimal value can be obtained by substituting the soft-optimal policy back into Equa-










As a result, we have the following corollary.








































For each state s ∈ S , the soft-optimal policy that solves the minimization problem Equa-














Proof. This proof is essentially the same as the proof for Lemma A.0.2. When the problem
is formulated as a minimization problem as in Equation (A.26), the Lagrangian multiplier β
becomes negative. The first-order condition in Equation (A.19) remains the same, while the
second-order condition in Equation (A.21) becomes positive, which guarantees a minimum.
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APPENDIX B
DERIVATION OF TWO-AGENT SOFT-Q LEARNING
Consider now the two-agent zero-sum case, where we have the policy-dependent soft value
defined in a similar manner as in Equation (A.3). We expand the expectation operator and
re-arrange terms to obtain
Vπ
pl,πop




































































































































































































































We consider the case where the Player is the maximizer and the Opponent is the minimizer.
Then, the definition of the soft-optimal value for the two-agent zero-sum game is



































where the soft-optimal Q-value is defined as in Equation (B.1).
Theorem B.1. The soft-optimal value in Equation (B.6) is unique.
To prove Theorem B.1, we first present the minimax by von Neumann [49].
Theorem B.2 (von Neumann). Let X ⊂ Rn and Y ⊂ Rm be compact convex sets. Assume
that f : X × Y → R is a continuous function that is component-wise concave-convex, that
is
f(·, y) : X → R is concave for all fixed y ∈ Y,











Now we can prove Theorem B.1.
Proof. First notice that the set of admissible policies for the Player, Πpl, can be written as
Πpl = ∆|Apl| ×∆|Apl| × · · · ×∆|Apl|︸ ︷︷ ︸
|S|
.
Specifically, Πpl is formed by the Cartesian product of |S| standard |Apl|-dimensional sim-
plices. Thus, Πpl is compact and convex. Similarly, Πop is also compact and convex.















































With βpl > 0, it can be seen from Equation (B.7) that Vπ
pl,πop




KL is convex in π
op, we can change the order of the two summations, as the
action spaces are finite. Via a similar reasoning, one can show that Vπ
pl,πop
KL is convex in π
op,
as βop < 0. Thus, the soft-optimal value in Equation (B.2) is unique.
















Observe that Equation (B.8) has the same structure as the optimization problem presented













Combining Equation (B.6) and Equation (B.8), we arrive at














where the maximization is solely dependent on πpl. Notice that Equation (B.9) has the
same structure as in Equation (A.14). By Lemma A.0.2, we have the closed-form solution










Applying Corollary A.0.3 to Equation (B.9), we obtain the soft-optimal value at each state













Since the soft-optimal value is unique, we can change the order of the max and min opera-
tors in Equation (B.6). We would then have a min-max optimization problem instead. The
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soft-optimal policy of the Opponent can be then derived in a similar manner. Namely, the




















ρop(aop|s) exp (βopQop,∗KL (s, a
op)) , (B.11)









, s ∈ S. (B.12)
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